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Performing Trustworthiness: 
The ‘Credibility Work’ of 
Prominent Sociologists
Ben Baumberg Geiger
University of Kent, UK
Abstract
To the limited extent that sociologists have considered non-academics’ trust in sociologists, 
legitimacy has become entwined with the idea of a value-free, ‘objective’ sociology. However, 
broader philosophical/sociological work suggests that credibility signals are more complex, with, 
for example, non-partisanship being separate to epistemic responsibility. In this article, I explore 
the nature of ‘credibility work’ in practice via interviews with 15 prominent English sociologists, 
making three contributions. First, I find that some sociologists deliberately pursue credibility, a 
phenomenon largely ignored in previous research. They do this primarily by ‘performing’ non-
partisanship or epistemic responsibility within interactions. Second, this credibility work does 
not require the pursuit of ‘objectivity’; sociologists can signal epistemic responsibility despite 
partisanship, or pursue ‘dispassionate advocacy’. Third, the extent and nature of credibility work 
varies by context; indeed some sociologists benefit from partisanship, while others feel no need 
for credibility work. I conclude by stressing the need for further research.
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Introduction
Sociologists have said surprisingly little about other people’s trust in them, and how this 
may be affected by their own behaviour. This is an unfortunate lacuna given mounting 
public concern about ‘post-truth’ politics. Even if the term ‘post-truth’ is misleading 
(Jasanoff and Simmet, 2017), there is evidence that trust in scientific experts has declined 
(at least among US conservatives; Gauchat, 2012), and there is an increasingly promi-
nent populist politics that brackets (social) scientists in with a malign ‘elite’ (Inglehart 
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and Norris, 2016). Moreover, even before Trump, Brexit, Orbán et al., considerable aca-
demic attention was devoted to trust in science (Gauchat, 2012; Gieryn, 1999; Shapin, 
1994; Silke, 2012) – yet such concerns were rarely taken up by sociologists.
This is not to suggest that trust in sociology has been entirely ignored by sociologists. 
Our discipline has always been subject to debates about whether we should present our-
selves as a ‘dispassionate science’, and while these debates are wide-ranging, legitimacy 
does feature within them (see below). However, these debates have two limitations. First, 
legitimacy is almost exclusively mentioned by those pursuing a value-free, ‘objective’ 
sociology. This vision is rejected on epistemological and moral grounds by those pursu-
ing a more value-committed sociology – but in the process, they ignore issues of legiti-
macy. As a result, concerns about trust become conflated with scientism. Second, there 
is no empirical attention given to what sociologists actually do. Indeed, even beyond 
sociology, there are few if any studies that consider whether (social) scientists deliber-
ately pursue credibility beyond the academe.
In this article, I empirically examine whether prominent English sociologists engage 
in such ‘credibility work’, based on interviews with 15 high-impact sociologists. This 
enables three contributions. First, I find that some sociologists deliberately pursue cred-
ibility, a phenomenon largely ignored in previous research. They do this primarily by 
‘performing’ non-partisanship or epistemic responsibility within interactions, rather than 
having a priori strategies. Second, this credibility work does not require the pursuit of 
‘objectivity’. Instead, sociologists can advocate for policies or use vivid language while 
presenting themselves as dispassionate; or present themselves as partisans with epis-
temic responsibility. Third, the extent and nature of credibility work varies by context; 
indeed some sociologists benefit from partisanship, while others feel no need for credi-
bility work. Before this, however, I first justify my claim that sociological debates tend 
to conflate concerns about trust with scientism.
Debating the Legitimacy of Sociology
My argument here is that sociologists only consider trust in sociology when debating the 
nature of the discipline, and even here debates about trust are partial. To provide evi-
dence for this, we can examine the most significant recent Anglo-American debate: 
Burawoy’s ‘public sociology’. This was a call for ‘sociology that seeks to bring sociol-
ogy to publics beyond the academy, promoting dialogue about issues that affect the fate 
of society’ (Burawoy et al., 2004: 104), which numerous sociologists responded to across 
special issues (Social Forces 82(4), Social Problems 51(1), the British Journal of 
Sociology 56(3), Critical Sociology 31(3) and the American Sociologist 36(3–4)) and 
edited collections (e.g. Clawson et al., 2007; Jeffries, 2009). What concerns us here, 
though, is the way in which trust in sociology is invoked.
Trust is mentioned by several critics of public sociology. Some critics focus on the 
inherent trustworthiness of sociological accounts, which they argue become untrustwor-
thy if we are too close to civil society (Goldberg and Van den Berg, 2009; Hammersley, 
2017; Nielsen, 2004; Tittle, 2004). But more importantly here, critics claim that even 
robust public sociology will be credibility-damaging because public sociologists display 
left-wing values that may not be shared by their audiences (Goldberg and Van den Berg, 
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2009; Tittle, 2004; Turner, 2005), and because they blur the distinction between knowl-
edge and advocacy (Goldberg and Van den Berg, 2009; Hammersley, 2017; Tittle, 2004). 
As Turner (2005: 30) puts it:
if sociologists simply throw their ideological hats into the ring, spouting off their own moral 
judgments, their credibility will be lost; and political counterattack will be easy. We become 
just another set of talking heads engaged in a moral crusade.
In defence, Burawoy accepts that trust in public sociology is helped by its coexistence 
with ‘professional sociology’, which ‘is not the enemy of . . . public sociology but the 
sine qua non of [its] existence – providing both legitimacy and expertise’ (Burawoy, 
2005a: 10). However, he otherwise ignores legitimacy, instead counter-attacking on 
other grounds:
How often have I heard professional sociologists dismiss public sociology as a euphemism for 
partisan sociology – and how public sociology threatens sociology’s legitimacy as a science 
. . . There is nothing wrong with activism, they say, but it should have nothing to do with 
sociology which, implicitly or explicitly is assumed to be value neutral. Again the tactic is to 
pathologize the enemy while simultaneously idealizing the self. (Burawoy, 2005b: 424)
In other words, legitimacy is only mentioned by those pursuing value-freedom, and is 
ignored by those who reject it. A similar pattern can be seen in pre-1920s US sociology, 
split between those attempting to reform society and those pursuing knowledge, as 
Burawoy notes (2005a). This debate was set against a background of legitimacy chal-
lenges, in which some radical sociologists were hounded out of the discipline completely 
(Furner, 1975; Smith, 1994). Just as in recent debates, legitimacy issues were only raised 
by those pursuing a more dispassionate sociology. For example, Du Bois argued that ‘the 
frequent alliance of sociological research with various panaceas and particular schemes 
of reform, has resulted in closely connecting social investigation with a good deal of 
groundless assumption and humbug in the popular mind’ (albeit before largely changing 
his mind; see Bright, 2018: 2232).
My point here is not to judge the strength of these arguments per se, but rather to show 
how concerns for legitimacy have become entwined with scientism. While this scientism 
has been robustly countered, this has been on the grounds of philosophical coherence and 
moral responsibility rather than legitimacy. Epistemologically, sociologists have written 
extensively about how to go beyond a binary choice between scientism and partisanship 
via, for example, Bourdieusian accounts that produce robust knowledge that reflect upon 
the categories they use to study the social world. And when it comes to trust/legitimacy in 
practice, sociologists similarly go beyond such a binary choice, as I will show. However, 
within the academic record, our discipline’s discussion of trust remains restricted to calls 
for a scientistic sociology, as part of a contrast with value-laden advocacy.
Further Accounts of Trust in (Social) Science
While sociologists have barely considered these issues, we can learn from wider 
accounts of trust in science/expertise, particularly Science and Technology Studies 
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(STS), for which credibility is a ‘fundamental topic’ (Shapin, 1995: 257). This analyses 
scientific disputes without any reference to their truth/falsity; we cannot say that the 
accounts of particular scientists win out because they are true, instead investigating why 
people regarded them as true; after which ‘the study of credibility then became simply 
coextensive with the study of knowledge’ (Shapin, 1995: 256). A particular concern in 
STS has been the way in which some individuals gain credibility through demarcating 
themselves from non-scientists (often invoking Mertonian norms such as disinterested-
ness and organised scepticism), known as ‘boundary-work’ (Gieryn, 1983). This is 
clearly relevant to sociology, and Gieryn himself (1999) has documented the efforts that 
social scientists made in the 1960s to persuade the US Congress that their work counts 
as ‘science’.
However, there are good philosophical reasons not to trust all scientists solely by 
virtue of their scientific status (Anderson, 2012; Goldman, 2001), and we see in practice 
that the credibility of individual scientists is often contested (of many examples within 
STS, see, for example, Campbell, 2004; Hilgartner, 2000; Shapin, 1994; Silke, 2012). 
This sometimes follows the binary distinction between advocacy and objectivity: studies 
of policymakers in real-world settings show they prefer what they consider to be objec-
tive evidence over ideologically driven, biased advice (Haynes et al., 2012; Jacobson and 
Goering, 2006; Weiss, 1980). Similarly, experimental studies among the general public 
show that if scientists make recommendations, they are viewed as less impartial (Beall 
et al., 2017; Elliott et al., 2017; Kotcher et al., 2017).
However, to fully understand the credibility of social scientists, we must go beyond a 
binary model. Philosophers of science and empirical STS studies both suggest that there 
are multiple dimensions to the trustworthiness of scientists, of which two are particularly 
important:
•• Motivation: there is wide agreement that someone who has a vested interest in a 
particular result should reasonably be viewed as less trustworthy (Anderson, 
2012; Goldman, 2001; Shapin, 1994: 223).
•• Epistemic responsibility: credibility also depends on what Elizabeth Anderson 
(2012: 146) terms ‘epistemic responsibility’: ‘whether testifiers are responsive to 
evidence, reasoning, and arguments others raise against their beliefs . . . The mark 
of epistemic responsibility is responsive accountability to the community of 
inquirers.’ Others have similarly emphasised the role of visible signs of being 
‘responsive to evidence’ (Douglas, 2015; Goldman, 2001: 94–97; Longino, 2002: 
130–133; Shapin, 1994: 223).
This raises the possibility of sociologists deliberately pursuing credibility, but not through 
the naive pursuit of ‘objectivity’. For example, they could admit that they have a stake in 
the result, while simultaneously signalling that their conclusions are firmly grounded in 
the evidence rather than in wishful thinking. The binary conception of credibility that we 
see in sociological debates (above) is therefore inadequate.
Yet if we want to understand sociologists’ deliberate pursuit of credibility with differ-
ent non-academic audiences – ‘credibility work’ – these literatures are still unsatisfac-
tory. First, STS focuses almost exclusively on the natural sciences; we would expect 
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credibility debates in the social sciences to operate differently, yet social sciences are 
studied by only a small and marginal part of STS (Pereira, 2019). Second, there is almost 
no research investigating whether credibility is consciously pursued, even by natural 
scientists. Three studies (one on climate science, two on public health) have suggested 
researchers are aware of credibility, and felt that they needed to present themselves as 
objective (Gundersen, 2018; Haynes et al., 2011; Jacobson and Goering, 2006). However, 
the only study that includes social scientists is the study of UK health inequalities 
researchers by Katherine Smith (2010, 2012).
These few studies do hint that ‘credibility work’ exists, and that it goes beyond a binary 
advocacy-objectivity model. Smith describes a divide between ‘critical’ and ‘policy-rele-
vant’ researchers, but emphasises that some critical researchers consciously blunted their 
critiques to some audiences in order to maintain ‘some level of policy credibility’ (Smith, 
2012: 157). And Haynes et al. (2011: 1050) argue that the debate about advocacy vs. 
objectivity is in practice often not about advocacy per se, but a ‘more subtle distinction 
between data-informed, moderated commentary and ideologically-driven proselytising 
which can ‘do more harm than good’. Yet a detailed study of whether prominent social 
scientists consciously pursue credibility – and if so, the nature of this work – is lacking. In 
this study I fill this gap.
Methods
Design
My aim here was to explore whether such ‘credibility work’ existed among English soci-
ologists, and if so, the extent to which sociologists in practice adopt more nuanced posi-
tions than the extremes of ‘advocacy’ vs. ‘objectivity’. The research design was based on 
semi-structured interviews, which provide the space for respondents to describe credibil-
ity work in their own words, as well as providing the opportunity to understand it within 
the context of their personal biographies. By design, interviews enable us to investigate 
the conscious pursuit of credibility; in the Discussion below I consider how to interpret 
this within the broader context of behaviours and attributes that may influence audi-
ences’ perceptions of credibility.
My sampling approach used the logic of a ‘most likely’ case study design (on using 
case study logics for interview sampling, see Small (2009), although the design can eas-
ily be re-described as purposive sampling). That is, for this small-scale exploratory study, 
I aimed to select ‘information rich’ (Patton, 2002: 242) cases in which credibility work 
was particularly likely. This was for two reasons: first, because I aimed to discover 
whether conscious ‘credibility work’ exists at all; and second, because I aimed to look at 
the nature of credibility work, for which evidence was only available from cases in 
which credibility work was present. In practice, I used policy/public impact as an out-
wardly observable sign of cases in which credibility work was likely. This was done via 
searches of impact case studies from the Research Excellence Framework (REF) 2014, 
searches for mentions of sociologists in online news media and examining prominent 
policy advisory roles.
There are limitations to this sampling approach. Having selected high-impact sociolo-
gists for whom credibility work is more likely, I cannot talk about the extent of credibility 
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work among sociologists in general. Moreover, given the widely noted problems of the 
REF impact agenda, this risks a sample that is relatively willing to make accommoda-
tions to policy elites, neglecting the more radical end of sociology that works outside of 
these elites towards longer-term radical change (Smith and Stewart, 2016). It may well 
be the case that credibility work outside of this sample takes a different form; as we will 
see below, credibility work depends, inter alia, on the preferences of each individual 
sociologist and on the audience judging their credibility, and I make no claim to have 
captured the full range of sociologists or audiences here. Nevertheless, the design is 
appropriate given the scale, exploratory nature and aims of the research, and in the 
Discussion below I consider fruitful avenues for future research.
I did however vary the sample according to other dimensions that are likely to influ-
ence credibility work, namely methodology and field of study. My expectation – borne 
out below – was that different fields of study and different types of evidence create dif-
ferent pressures and opportunities for credibility work, and capturing this variability 
within the sample enables an exploratory analysis of the role of sociological context in 
credibility work (see below). Reflecting this, I focused on those studying sociological 
terrain from any disciplinary base, including criminologists, social policy scholars and 
social geographers. Ultimately the interviewees covered a variety of sociological topics, 
including inequality; the welfare state; ethnicity/integration; addictions; disability; fam-
ily policy and social work; and charitable giving.
The final sample included 14 interviews with 15 sociologists (two long-term collabo-
rators being interviewed together). Interviewees include some of the most well-known 
and influential sociologists in the country; most (13) were Professors, and the majority 
(12) were involved in REF impact case studies in 2014. Eight of those invited to partici-
pate declined, five of whom were female, leaving only three female participants; I dis-
cuss this when considering epistemic injustice below.
Fieldwork
Interviews were predominantly conducted face-to-face at a location of interviewees’ 
choice (one was conducted by video-call) in August–September 2018, and lasted 50–102 
minutes (averaging 73 minutes). Interviews were transcribed and then analysed through 
a mixture of thematic coding and case summaries. Thematic coding in NVivo enabled 
me to organise participants’ accounts around my research questions, allowing differences 
between accounts on specific issues to be explored in-depth. Complementing this, case 
summaries allowed accounts on specific issues to be placed in the context of each inter-
viewee’s account/biography, avoiding the fracturing tendency in purely thematic analy-
ses. Interviewees were given a choice about the level of anonymity they would prefer; 
interviewees below are referred to by name where they gave consent and where the 
individual’s biography is helpful for understanding their responses. Quotes either give 
life to typical responses or highlight unusual cases, while trying to use the full set of 
accounts. I return to limitations and the need for further research in the Discussion below.
Half of the interviewees knew me personally, which helped recruitment and rapport 
and allowed greater space for interviewer and interviewee to challenge one another. This 
does however raise additional ethical issues around consent and anonymity; additional 
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safeguards were provided, and the project was approved by the University of Kent 
research ethics committee (SRCEA id 209). So-called ‘elite interviews’ do not raise fun-
damentally different issues to other interviews, but often have unusual power dynamics 
(Smith, 2006), and there is likely to be a greater-than-usual element of conscious self-
presentation here, as I return to below.
In the interviews, I directly asked respondents about whether they took deliberate 
steps to be seen as trustworthy, as well as asking how they thought others perceived 
them, any challenges to their credibility and whether they gave policy advice. (These 
were adapted to the particular biography of each interviewee, based on prior desk 
research.) This crucially allowed me to probe the absence as well as the presence of 
conscious credibility work, rather than leaving silence as ambiguous. While such direc-
tional questioning could be leading in other contexts, this was suitable for this group of 
prominent academics, who were prepared to challenge my views – as I show below – and 
who expected to be allowed to engage directly with the project’s hypotheses.
Results I: The Nature of Credibility Work
There were plentiful examples of respondents consciously presenting themselves as 
credible to non-academic audiences – ‘credibility work’. To understand this, we must 
examine how different contexts provide more/less pressures for credibility work, which 
is covered below. First, though, I examine the two main types of credibility work that 
participants described: non-partisanship and epistemic responsibility. (We return below 
to other, rarer forms of credibility work.)
Non-Partisanship
There was clear evidence that some high-profile sociologists consciously tried to present 
themselves as ‘non-partisan’ – that is, they suppressed signalling their personal value 
positions to avoid being seen as a vested interest. This could take various forms, whether 
avoiding advocacy (e.g. not making direct recommendations in research reports; avoid-
ing round-robin letters to newspapers), not joining a political party or not identifying 
closely with social movements. It could also be performed within social interactions:
When I was interviewed for [an official role], I made a conscious effort to present myself as 
quite a ‘small c’ conservative person, because I knew they probably wouldn’t select me if they 
thought of me as being too radical. So I went in the soberest [outfit] I’ve got, I presented myself 
in the most scientifically respectable way possible . . . It wasn’t about the credibility of my 
science, it’s about who you are and what sort of person people perceive you to be. And you can 
deliberately create that impression.
At times, such credibility work could be consciously insincere, with avowed radicals 
adopting a neutral’s clothing to avoid being dismissed – ‘almost pretending you’re not an 
old leftie’, as one put it. But for most, conscious displays of non-partisanship were a way 
of demonstrating independence of thought rather than pure neutrality. Paul Gregg – an 
adviser within New Labour – explained that he
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would always wear my most ripped pair of jeans whenever I met Tony Blair [then-Prime 
Minister] . . . That [outfit] created the distance. I wasn’t one of their suits . . . I wanted to create 
that kind of image that I’m semi-independent, I can be trusted but I’m a voice that’s trying to 
be . . . distant and sometimes provocative.
Epistemic Responsibility
The other common dimension of credibility work was performing ‘epistemic responsi-
bility’ – being ‘responsive to evidence, reasoning, and arguments others raise against 
their beliefs’ (Anderson, 2012: 146) – which could be signalled in various ways. First, 
nearly every respondent emphasised that they were based on the evidence, often con-
trasting this with the ‘rent-a-quote’: ‘anyone can gob off and then you go on Newsnight 
and say something provocative and you’re a star, but that’s not what I do’. Second, sev-
eral visible partisans felt that engaging with political opponents in a respectful matter – 
particularly genuine listening and engagement – was a powerful way of signalling 
trustworthiness. Third, most tried to manage their emotional tone, particularly anger. 
Anger was described as ‘going off on one’, ‘ranting’ or ‘losing it’; ‘it would make great 
telly but it won’t get the message across, they’ll just think “look at that fool”’. Avoiding 
anger was sometimes felt to be a particular challenge on Twitter, which several respond-
ents had therefore stopped using after potentially credibility-damaging failures to man-
age their emotional tone.
Finally, epistemic responsibility could also be performed through the very argument 
that was being presented. The social scientists I spoke to often ‘tried to be as fair as pos-
sible’, to show that ‘you will change your mind when the evidence changes’ and to 
‘head off’ any damaging criticisms that were likely to be raised; others visibly consid-
ered uncertainties and alternative interpretations. These were partly presented as good 
academic practice (see below), but also as deliberate signals of credibility. Hence for 
one academic who was ‘seen as biased’ from previous critical work, it was important 
that they ‘bent over the other way’ in trying to consider whether their new qualitative 
research could possibly support the Government’s claims. John Hills – a widely trusted 
LSE professor working on inequality – described the challenge of considering alterna-
tives in short media appearances: ‘you are trying to get over the idea that although 
you’ve only got two minutes to talk, you have thought about the arguments going in 
different directions’.
Dispassionate Advocacy. Yet belying the binary opposition of ‘advocacy’ vs. ‘objectivity’, 
epistemic responsibility could be performed while social scientists advocated for par-
ticular policies, and/or used emotional, vivid language. With respect to emotional tone, 
for example, there was rarely a complete suppression of ‘emotion’ in order to emphasise 
‘reason’. Emotions were often seen as appropriate: ‘you don’t burst into tears, but you 
make it quite clear that this is emotionally important, it’s not just an interesting intellec-
tual problem how many children die’. But more than this, as long as anger itself was 
avoided, then emotional engagement could be valuable in putting together a persuasive 
‘call-to-arms’: as one put it, ‘to some extent you have to back off the distal or objective 
academic and be a little bit more out there and in people’s faces’. The ideal position was 
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sometimes to be ‘passionate’ but not angry, or in the evocative phrase that Alex Stevens 
used, to express ‘cold fury’ – an authentic and appropriate display of emotion that none-
theless signals that values are being managed.
What is perhaps most striking is how independent these considerations were from 
‘advocacy’ in the narrow sense of arguing for a particular policy option. Most respond-
ents were willing to recommend particular courses of action, even while simultaneously 
trying to position themselves as non-partisan and signal epistemic responsibility. In 
every case, they did this by emphasising how their advocacy was evidence-based; for 
example, one argued that their recommendations were ‘not about a normative position’, 
and instead they were ‘trying to let the evidence speak’. We can perhaps term this ‘dis-
passionate advocacy’, noting the clear affinities with the UK’s ‘evidence-based policy’ 
movement.
Results II: Clarifying Credibility Work
Before proceeding further, we need to clarify that ‘credibility work’ is an ‘analyst’s cat-
egory’ (Collins, 2008) – it is built upon sociologists’ accounts of their behaviour and its 
motivation, but it is not a term that they themselves use. This is important in two ways. 
First, the pursuit of credibility was not a dominant aspect of these sociologists’ daily 
lives. It was not uncommon for academics to explicitly reject the idea that they ‘went 
around thinking “I’ve got to do this in order to gain more credibility”’, or that they did 
what one dismissively called ‘strategic credibility management in the way a PR agency 
might’. Nevertheless, there were countless examples of small, occasional, ad hoc but 
deliberate decisions in the light of a risk of being discredited, as one interviewee put 
unusually clearly:
I don’t think I’ve gone through with a headline strategy of saying, ‘I need to build up my 
credibility as an expert’ . . . It’s more like, you do make these micro-decisions on a day-to-day 
basis as things arise that could affect your credibility, and your guiding principle is ‘I need to 
maintain my independence and credibility’.
Credibility work was therefore largely a matter of performance – one participant even 
described making ‘a play out of being credible, and in very practical performative terms’. 
The metaphor of performance is often associated with Goffman’s dramaturgical meta-
phor, and has been used to capture the way that professionals – including scientific advis-
ers (Hilgartner, 2000) – present themselves. However, I here more narrowly refer to 
‘performance’ to capture the ways in which credibility was consciously signalled in the 
midst of interactions with non-academics, which better captures most credibility work 
than the idea of credibility work as a priori strategic thinking.
A second clarification is that occasional interviewees directly resisted the concept of 
credibility work: ‘Isn’t that interesting, you’re talking about the presentation of self here 
aren’t you? Well to be honest I’ve never felt that. I don’t think I’ve got to prove myself.’ 
Yet such statements should not be taken at face value; the same respondent shortly after-
wards described consciously considering credibility (‘I’ve tried, personally and my 
teams and the places I worked, to make sure we don’t get dismissed’). Instead, this shows 
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how admitting to credibility work could itself be discrediting; as another said, ‘playing 
to your audience in a small way is okay, but if you do it in a big way you become untrust-
worthy, cause you’re just conning them’. As this respondent stressed, the impression of 
credibility overlapped with behaving with integrity:
The primary route for gaining trust is to be trustworthy. And so you don’t bullshit, you don’t 
fiddle your figures, you don’t jump over challenging bits in your argument, you don’t 
overstate your conclusions, and then you make it more likely that people will trust you, cause 
you earn it.
This concern with sincerity resonates with a common view in STS that scientists are 
‘actors [who] use stage management techniques’ to present themselves as disinterested, 
and that these ‘prevent their audiences from seeing this performance as the authoritarian 
ruse that it is’ (Campbell, 2004: 433) – which mirrors a common critique of Goffman-
esque ‘impression management’. There were rare examples here where a concern for 
others’ perceptions meant that a performance was insincere. However, there is nothing in 
Goffman’s work that requires performance to be insincere (Tseëlon, 1992), and in prac-
tice, I found that credibility work was overwhelmingly sincere. Moreover, it has been 
influentially argued by Naomi Scheman (2001: 35) that scientists have an obligation to 
communicate their trustworthiness in order to justify their societal role. There is nothing 
in my concept of ‘credibility work’ that implies insincerity, and I share Scheman’s view 
that credible sociologists have an obligation to demonstrate their credibility.
To be clear: ‘credibility work’ does not incorporate behaviours that are not motivated 
by the pursuit of credibility, even if they are credibility-enhancing (e.g. good methodo-
logical practice). But we must accept the possibility that some sociologists underplayed 
the extent to which behaviours were motivated by credibility, given that some associated 
credibility work with insincerity.
Results III: Credibility Work in Context
Trustworthiness is not a unidimensional phenomenon, instead depending on both the 
audience and the type of trust to be given (Haynes et al., 2012: 6; Jones, 2012). The non-
academic audiences considered here include, inter alia, politicians, civil servants, civil 
society groups, the media and the public (none of whom are homogeneous), which means 
that the pressure for credibility work per se and the way that credibility is judged will 
vary. In this final section I therefore turn to how the context of credibility work affects its 
nature and extent.
Where Partisanship Connotes Credibility
We have seen that some sociologists deliberately signalled non-partisanship, but other 
sociologists spoke of situations in which partisanship helped their credibility. This was 
particularly the case when being drawn into the inner circle of powerful politicians (in all 
cases here, Labour politicians), who were concerned with ‘political credibility’ – whether 
the sociologist was ‘on their side’ or ‘ideologically trustworthy’:
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Particularly within the Labour Party, it is ‘are they one of us?’ syndrome, and at some point 
what they want from you is to know that you’re going to come out with a range of ideas that are 
within their blanket brackets of the acceptable, or the politically sympathetic.
This was changeable; insiders could be cast out if they publicly backed a policy that was 
outside political acceptability, or if the dominant ideological strand of the Labour Party 
itself changed (senior advisers in the Blair/Brown government lost their political credi-
bility under the Corbyn leadership). But what matters for our purposes is that partisan-
ship could be an asset rather than a liability.
Partisanship could also help gain trust in other ways. Both politicians and the media 
would sometimes search out expert advocates of a particular position, wanting them to 
make their case as persuasively as possible. And while the sample design privileged 
sociologists who worked with politicians/policymakers/the media rather than smaller 
advocacy groups (see above), there were nevertheless examples of partisanship helping 
via a chain of credibility:
I think there was a time . . . where really certain researchers were seen very much as allies of 
advocates. And then because we were also working in a European space, those civil society 
advocates were also very prominently placed in policy debates. Always in the room. And so 
their endorsement of us as allies would have perhaps made a difference.
However, partisanship rarely constituted ‘credibility work’. In only one case did a sociolo-
gist deliberately tried to garner credibility via partisanship (this was a respondent on the 
right of the Labour Party who made a point of signalling their longstanding party member-
ship). Moreover, partisanship was largely helpful for political credibility – being trusted to 
frame problems and solutions in politically useful ways – rather than the epistemic credibil-
ity that concerns us here. This does not mean that epistemic credibility is irrelevant to 
sociologists working in partisan contexts. I have already given the example of Paul Gregg 
talking to New Labour politicians (who signalled that ‘I can be trusted but I’m a voice 
that’s trying to be . . . distant and sometimes provocative’), which others echoed: ‘Talking 
to politicians, you’d get tested out on two levels . . . [One is], “this is somebody who 
knows about his subject” . . . The other one is “can I trust this guy politically?”’
The role of partisanship in credibility is therefore complex, and I return below to how 
future research could explore this further. But from the interviews here, it is clear that 
sociologists engage with different non-academic audiences in different roles, which 
change the role of partisanship. Some sociologists sometimes deliberately pursued epis-
temic credibility by signalling non-partisanship. But at other times – particularly when 
becoming partly political actors – partisanship was valuable because it increased sociolo-
gists’ political credibility, even if this occurred alongside other credibility work to main-
tain their epistemic credibility.
The Pressure for Credibility Work
Context affected not just the value of partisanship, but the very pressure for credibility 
work itself. I consider this through three lenses: (1) where credibility work was 
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unnecessary; (2) where credibility was assumed rather than achieved; and (3) where 
pressures for credibility work were ignored.
Where Credibility Work Was Unnecessary. Some sociologists faced contexts where their 
credibility was vigorously challenged, but others faced less challenge, and in two cases 
felt no challenge whatsoever. While these two respondents varied in many ways – for 
example, seniority, institutional prestige – they were united by working within fields that 
had large and powerful practitioner communities, which they saw themselves as partly 
representing, and which in return supported their credibility. As one put it:
I didn’t want to go in and be authoritative in telling the sector what to do. I wanted to be 
authoritative in articulating the sector’s views, adding my own intellectual value, whatever it 
was, and being authoritative to the politicians.
They were also similar in that they made policy recommendations that were not party-
political. It is not that they hid their (left-wing) political positions, but rather that their 
ideas were widely accepted by practitioners, and had value to politicians across the 
political spectrum. One actively tried to present themselves to politicians as ‘not politi-
cally partisan but aligned with their objectives: so here’s how I can help you do what 
you want to do’. The other had taken a role for the (Conservative-led) Coalition 
Government, and reflected that ‘to some degree the Government were happy to accept 
my recommendations because they saw them as fitting within [their agenda]. So they 
liked them for the wrong reasons.’
In these contexts, credibility was the default; one simply said, ‘I don’t feel a huge 
burden of proving my objectivity.’ While this extreme was rare among the sociologists I 
spoke to, there were elements reported by others; for example, finding less need for cred-
ibility work where ideas were presented as apolitical, or doing less credibility work 
where fields became less politically contentious over time. To understand the (non-)
existence of credibility work, we must understand the politicisation of a given sociolo-
gist’s field, which determines the reputational pressures they are likely to face.
Assumed Credibility. Aside from their deliberate credibility work, some sociologists 
seemed to benefit from audiences’ a priori assumption that they were trustworthy. This 
partly reflected their research methods, with several qualitative researchers feeling that 
their research was under-valued: ‘qualitative work is easily dismissed because it’s not 
[whispered] “science”’. One sociologist even resorted to doing qualitative research with 
quantitative sample sizes and then quantitising their results to maximise their credibility 
in political debate: ‘I’ve got little graphs that show [a key finding] that we put in the final 
report because they want to see this, even though it’s not really the heart of what we’re 
doing.’
It is nonetheless over-simplistic to treat this as a quantitative/qualitative divide. A 
sociologist doing more complex quantitative modelling pointed out the credibility chal-
lenges that complexity introduced, reflecting that ‘it’s perhaps easier for people who are 
doing a simpler piece of work’. In contrast, those doing simple quantitative research 
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could choose to provide (what was perceived to be) unmediated access to descriptive 
quantitative data. Danny Dorling – a high-profile academic working on inequalities – 
argued that the ‘best evidence for [my credibility] strategising’ was that he put all of his 
underlying data on the internet from the mid-2000s; he retrospectively felt that ‘some-
thing must have happened that made me think, “You can easily be attacked on this.”’ This 
is a different type of credibility work to the previous section: it is not that Dorling was 
here demonstrating his trustworthiness, but rather that he attempted to reduce the very 
need for trust (as he said when we discussed one claim, ‘you can look at the data and say 
I’m wrong’).
Credibility could also be assumed based on personal attributes. Foremost among these 
were markers of academic prestige such as the title ‘professor’ or being attached to a 
prestigious university; as the Oxford-based Danny Dorling put it, ‘for the very right wing 
of the British press, Oxford can do no wrong. It’s where they went and it produced them, 
it made them, so it must be great.’ Sometimes sociologists deliberately publicised such 
markers in order to enhance credibility, although overall this was a minor element of 
‘credibility work’. I also expected disadvantaged groups – for example, women, ethnic 
minorities – to suffer ‘epistemic injustices’ (Pereira, 2019) that heightened the impor-
tance of credibility work, but most respondents explicitly rejected this. This may partly 
be explained by the aforementioned under-representation of women in the sample; how-
ever, those women I interviewed did not feel that their gender devalued their credibility, 
with epistemic injustice only being raised by two male respondents in the context of 
unusually patriarchal settings such as the House of Lords.
However, we must be tentative about these claims, as I did not speak to sociological 
audiences, and sociologists themselves may be an unreliable guide to audiences’ reac-
tions, or unaware of the reasons that their strategies were successful. For example, it is 
clearly not the case that any audiences really have ‘unmediated’ access to Danny 
Dorling’s data, given his role in framing, designing, collecting, cleaning and interpreting 
his data. Given that other publicly available data are contested (e.g. official labour force/
immigration statistics), it is unclear – both to myself and probably to Dorling himself – 
what conditions are necessary for his strategy to be successful. Moreover, given that I 
selected sociologists on the grounds of high impact, the female sociologists I spoke to 
may be unrepresentative of the experiences of other female sociologists. I return below 
to how future research could further explore this ‘assumed credibility’.
Ignoring Pressures for Credibility Work. Finally, it should go without saying that sociolo-
gists are active agents who can choose how to respond to the pressures they face. Several 
interviewees described doing less credibility work as their careers progressed, partly 
because they became sceptical about the power of credibility work:
I feel much more willing to pin my political colours to the mast than I used to. I used to feel it 
was quite useful to be able to say, ‘I don’t belong to any political party, here’s my evidence, 
make of it what you will’, almost like pretending you’re not an old leftie. But I don’t feel that 
anymore . . . [With emphasis] See the thing is I don’t think really that people change their 
minds that much.
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Given that I deliberately chose a sample in which credibility work was likely, it may well 
be the case that sociologists outside of my sample are even more likely to ignore the pres-
sures for credibility work.
Discussion
Sociologists have rarely considered how other people’s trust in them may be influenced 
by their own behaviour; to the extent they have, it is considered only by those arguing 
for a value-free, ‘objective’ sociology, which many sociologists reject on epistemologi-
cal or moral grounds. Moreover, despite the wealth of insights from STS and philoso-
phy of science, almost no previous studies have examined whether social scientists 
consciously try to shape their credibility to non-academic audiences (‘credibility work’). 
The present article therefore reports findings from an exploratory study of whether 
sociologists conduct such credibility work, and if so, what form this takes, using quali-
tative interviews with 15 prominent English sociologists. The findings make three con-
tributions to the literature.
First, I found clear evidence that credibility work exists: some sociologists do con-
sciously pursue credibility with non-academic audiences, mostly by performing credibil-
ity via small, ad hoc decisions to deflect credibility threats. This is itself a contribution: 
even for natural scientists, empirical research has largely ignored the existence of credi-
bility work (the only exceptions being Gundersen, 2018; Haynes et al., 2011; Jacobson 
and Goering, 2006), and only Smith (2010, 2012) examines this – briefly – for social 
scientists. I found that this credibility work can take various forms, including signalling 
partisanship, increasing transparency, signalling markers of prestige or quantitising qual-
itative data. Predominantly, though, credibility work took the form of signalling non-
partisanship or epistemic responsibility (that is, being visibly responsive to evidence and 
argument; Anderson, 2012).
Second, credibility work goes beyond the way that sociologists discuss trust within 
academic debates. In these debates, trust/legitimacy is only considered by those pur-
suing scientism, who argue trust requires a value-free, ‘objective’ sociology, rather 
than partisan, untrusted advocacy. In contrast, sociologists in practice adopted more 
nuanced positions; for example, being partisan while signalling epistemic responsi-
bility. Many also pursued ‘dispassionate advocacy’: they recommended particular 
courses of action but nevertheless tried to avoid being labelled as a pure advocate. 
They did this by stressing the connection between evidence and their recommenda-
tions, emphasising their non-partisan status, engaging with those with different val-
ues, demonstrating their willingness to consider alternative accounts or managing 
their emotional tone.
Finally, the extent and nature of credibility work varied. While some sociologists 
signalled non-partisanship to gain credibility, others were aware that partisanship 
helped gain political trust. While most sociologists felt a pressure to deflect credibil-
ity threats, a few felt less/no pressure, particularly when making apolitical recom-
mendations supported by practitioners, or where they benefited from an a priori 
assumption of credibility. And even if sociologists were aware of credibility threats, 
they could choose to ignore them. We should therefore expect credibility work to be 
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heterogeneous across contexts, and it is perhaps unsurprising that the rare quantitative 
studies of the effect of different types of credibility work find mixed results (e.g. for 
the effect of revealing scientists’ values; Beall et al., 2017; Elliott et al., 2017; Kotcher 
et al., 2017).
Limitations
This was an exploratory study, and there is a need for future research that goes further in 
both sample and method. Regarding the sample, I spoke only to English sociologists who 
were high-impact in a particular sense (those with REF impact submissions/prominent 
advisory roles/regular media appearances). This risks a sample that is relatively willing 
to make accommodations to policy elites (Smith and Stewart, 2016); it is likely that other 
sociologists engage differently with non-academic audiences, using theoretical rather 
than empirical insights to work with grassroots organisations towards long-term radical 
change. Future research should therefore include a broader and more international sam-
ple to see if credibility work exists in other contexts, and if so, whether it takes a different 
form to that found here.
Regarding method, I chose interviews so that I could explore whether sociologists 
were motivated by credibility, but other methods are now needed. First, future studies 
should complement interviews with detailed observational studies of how sociologists 
perform credibility in different contexts (ranging from face-to-face meetings to social 
media). Second, credibility work may be unsuccessful, with credibility instead depend-
ing more on other behaviours/characteristics – making it crucial to study audience 
reactions. Third, it seems likely that sociologists are selected for being credible, which 
reduces the need to consciously pursue credibility. This may explain why for example 
prominent female academics did not report gender-related epistemic injustice (as their 
participation in the research was conditional on having overcome this). It would there-
fore be valuable to conduct a longitudinal project based on a heterogeneous cohort of 
early career social scientists, which examined both their characteristics and practices 
over a sustained period of time, and the ways in which different audiences responded 
to them.
This was an exploratory study for an issue that is curiously under-studied by soci-
ologists. It is already clear that sociologists have more subtle choices available to them 
epistemologically than ‘advocacy’ versus ‘objectivity’; in this article, I hope to have 
demonstrated that the same is true when considering credibility, even if the impacts of 
different practices (and the trade-offs inherent to them) are questions left to future 
research.
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